Counterfactual and prefactual conditionals.
We consider reasoning about prefactual possibilities in the future, for example, "if I were to win the lottery next year I would buy a yacht" and counterfactual possibilities, for example, "if I had won the lottery last year, I would have bought a yacht." People may reason about indicative conditionals, for example, "if I won the lottery I bought a yacht" by keeping in mind a few true possibilities, for example, "I won the lottery and I bought a yacht." They understand counterfactuals by keeping in mind two possibilities, the conjecture, "I won the lottery and I bought a yacht" and the presupposed facts, "I did not win the lottery and I did not buy a yacht." We report the results of three experiments on prefactuals that examine what people judge them to imply, the possibilities they judge to be consistent with them, and the inferences they judge to follow from them. The results show that reasoners keep a single possibility in mind to understand a prefactual.